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The aim of this article is to help to clarify the role
which Aristotle gives to definition in his theory of demon-
stration.11 shall begin by examining his handling of the re-
lations between definition and demonstration in chapters
8-10 of the second book of the Posterior Analytics,2 in order
to provide an outline for an interpretation of Aristotle's
thought. Secondly, I shall examine chapter 10 in more de-
tail, bringing out the contrast between the commentary by
Averroes and that of Grosseteste. I have chosen these two
commentators because, both being generally magnificent
interpreters of Aristotle, as far as the nature and types of
definition are concerned their understanding of Aristotle
is strikingly different.
1. A recent, very brilliant study which contributes to clarify this role is M, Des-
lauriers, Aristotle on Definition, Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2007.
2. One relatively recent book that focuses only on these chapters is O. Goldin, Ex-
plainingan Eclipse (1996). Other classical references are: R. Bolton, "Essentialism and
Semantíc Theory in Aristotle: Posterior Amhjtics II, 7-10", Tlie Philosophical Revielv 85/4
(1976), 514-544; J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Theory of Definition: Some Questions on
Posterior Analytics II 8-10", in Aristotle on Science. The "Posterior Analytics" (E. Berti,
ed.), Antenore, Padova, 1981, 359-384; D. Demoss & D. Devereux, "Essence, Exis-
tence, and Nominal Definition in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II8-10", Phronesis 33/2
(1988), 133-154; G. Bayer, "Definition through Demonstration: The Two Types of
Syllogisms in Posterior Analytics 11.8", Phronesis 40/3 (1995), 241-264; G. Bayer, "The
What-is-X? Question in the Posterior Analytics"', Ancient Phibsophy 17 (1997), 317-334.
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Book II of the Posterior Analytics begins by posing the
question "what is it?" (ti estin, which would seem to be a
question that can be answered by giving a definition) as
one of the four questions that can be raised in the course
of inquiry (zetoumena), and which will be answered or
"known" (epistamena) when the search is ended (89b 23-
25). On the other hand, some lines further on, the question
"what is it?" is identified in some cases with the question
"why is it?" (to dioti, the answer to which seems to be given
not by a definition, but by a scientific demonstration as
understood by Aristotle): "by 'one of the ítems' <I mean>
eclipse, equality, inequality, if it is in the middle or not. In
all these cases it is clear that what it is and why it is are the
same". (90a 13-15)3
The cases in which these two aspects are identical (il-
lustrated in II.2 using the examples of the eclipse and the
harmony) are precisely the proper object of scientific in-
quiry as Aristotle understood it: cases in which there is a
combination of things which are heterogeneous, but where
one inheres kath' auto in another (being eclipsed does not
belong to the essence of the moon, but it holds of it because
of what the moon is; to harmonise does not belong to the
definition of the high or the low, btit they harmonise be-
catise of what these things themselves are). This is why Ar-
istotle says that inquiry is always a search for the middle:4
what is sought is the cause which explains why two differ-
ent things are combined.
If, for the objects of science, the ivhy is identified with
the what it is, and if the why is a rnatter for demonstration
whereas the what it is is a rnatter of definition, then defini-
tion and demonstration seem to be competing for a place
in scientific knowledge. This apparent difficulty is what
obliges Aristotle, before he goes on with his study of the
3. The Aristotelian texts are taken from Barnes: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,
Translated with a Commentary by Jonathan Barnes, Second Edition, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1993.
4. I prefer to transíate "mesón" as "middle", instead of "middle term".
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episteme, to take a break (for eight chapters, 3-10) in order
to clarify two points: first, what exactly is the relationship
between the question tí estin and demonstration; and sec-
ond, what is definition, and what part does it play with
regard to demonstration?
2. An exarnple: understanding eclipses
Before we analyse Aristotle's texts, it may be useful to
pause to consider one of the examples of episteme which
is explained in more detail in the Posterior Analytics, and
which forms the subject of rnany of the reflections in II.8,
namely "scientific knowledge" or "understanding" about
eclipses.
Let us recall that Aristotle understands the episteme as
a degree of knowledge which is superior to perception,
and also superior to mere experience, because it is "knowl-
edge of the universal" or "knowledge through the cause".
Perceptions lie at the origin of all our knowledge, but they
are not the highest knowledge to which a human being can
aspire. In the case that interests us here, our knowledge
of eclipses begins with perception, but does not end there,
because this imperfect knowledge naturally awakens in tis
the desire to seek higher knowledge.
The process which leads us to understanding the
eclipse involves different types of imperfect knowledge,
which are superseded once we come to know why the
moon is eclipsed (to dioti). The question ivhy is raised on the
basis of (sensory) knowledge of the existence of the eclipse,
which in turn depends on previous knowledge that the
moon exists, and on our initial knowledge (which is still
partial) of what it means for the moon to be eclipsed: the
fact that the moon is eclipsed means that its light does not
reach us (knowledge of the eclipse as deprivation of light).
On the basis of the knowledge that two heterogeneotis
things are combined (the rnoon is eclipsed), we can conduct
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scientífic research intended to find out a middle which ex-
plains this combination, the cause which makes the being
eclipsad to hold of the inoon. Why is the moon eclipsed?
Because its fire is extinguished? Because the moon tums,
and its light is therefore hidden? Because an opaque body
is screening it from the sunlight? Once we have found this
middle, we can construct a demonstrative syllogism which
will provide us with scientific knowledge of the eclipse.
The conclusión of this demonstrative syllogism will be a
truth that we already knew, "the moon is eclipsed", but
our knowledge will be of a higher order, because we know
about its cause.
What does definition have to do with this process? We
shall remember that the sphere of scientific knowledge is
the sphere of things for which asking why is equivalent to
asking what it is. The combination of an attribute with a
subject (that the moon is eclipsed), about which we ask why
it occurs (to dioti), results in the emergence of a new entity
made up of the attribute with its subject (an eclipse of the
moon), which raises a new question, the question as to ivhat
it is (ti estiri). The answer to the question "why does the
combination occur?" lies in the scientific demonstration that
the moon is eclipsed. The answer to the question "what is
this compound?" lies in the definition of the eclipse. Aristo-
tle's central thesis concerning scientific knowledge about
eclipses is that the demonstration that the moon is eclipsed
also gives us a definition of what an eclipse is.
Aristotle is aware that this thesis rnay seern surpris-
ing (as his argurnents in chapters 3-7 show): if the demon-
stration gives us the definition, can we demónstrate what
something is?5 Clarification of what his thesis means in-
volves three stages, which I shall examine separately: a)
5. The point is crucial, as it shows the tensión between Metaphysics and Poste-
rior Analytics: substances (for example, man) are definable and not demonstrable,
events (for example, eclipse) are demonstrable and not strictly definable. But in
the Posterior Analytics Aristotle wants events to be definable in some sense, and
what ihey are to be demonstrable in some sense.
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answering the question about the possibility of demon-
strating the what it is; b) delimiting the different rneanings
of the terrn "definition"; c) distinguishing the functions
that the definition may carry out with regard to demon-
stration, according to what is being defined.
3. The flrst problem: is it possible ío demónstrate
the what¡t/¿? (Posterior AnalyticsII, 8)
In chapter 8, Aristotle takes up again the thesis, which
has already been established, that it is the same to know
the what it is and to know the canse of whether it is" (93a 4).
Sínce these two questions are given as identical, it seems
that in some cases it should be possible to know demon-
stratively the what it is, given that some causes are demon-
strable (93a 5-7). (Others, however, are not: the essence
of simple substances cannot be demonstrated.) But how
could we demónstrate the what it is? Would it be possible
to construct a demonstrative lagos of the what it is, or is the
definition the only admissible logos of what something is?
After examining the main difficulties raised by this possi-
bility in chapters 3-7, Aristotle goes on in chapters 8 and 9
to show in what cases and in what sense it is possible to say
that there is a demonstrative logos of the what it is.
First, in 93a 4-15, Aristotle argües that the demonstra-
tion we are seeking cannot have a what it is as a conclusión,
because it would be necessary to include another what it is
as a middle, and we would have not a demonstration but
an instance of dialectic syllogism (perhaps a circular one,
as he argües in chapter 4, or perhaps one that is simply not
demonstrative).
Once he has established that the demonstration of the
lohat it is cannot have this as a conclusión, in 93a 16 he an-
nounces that he is going to explain in what other way it can
be accepted that we have a "demonstration" of the lohat it
is. The final answer will be that the lohat it is is not demon-
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strated directly, as a conclusión, but is "shown" through
a demonstration (93b 15-20), and that the lagos which for-
mulates this what it is can then be regarded as a "demon-
stration" (in an improper sense) of the ivhat it is. So what
syllogism will be capable of showing the what it is in this
way, and what is the logos that expresses this? The core of
chapter 8 concentrates on constructing the answer to this
double question.
First of all, Aristotle formúlales a requirement that
must be fulfilled in order to have genuine knowledge of
the what it is (and therefore to achieve the "demonstration"
of the what it is that we are looking for): "we plainly can-
not grasp what it is to be something without grasping that
it exists" (93a 20). If it is not possible to grasp the essence
without grasping the existence, then we cannot formúlate a
syllogism capable of showing the what it is of a given thing
without grasping its existence. But Aristotle distinguishes
two senses of "grasping existence": a "proper" sense and
an "incidental" sense. Sornetimes we believe we are grasp-
ing the existence of something, but only incidentally can
we say that we grasp that something exists.
Áccording to Aristotle, we only grasp that a thing ex-
ists in the proper sense when we have "something of the
thing itself". In otir exarnple, when we have a logos of the
eclipse as deprivation of light. If we grasp that a depri-
vation of light has occurred on the moon, given that this
deprivation of light is something that belongs to the thing
itself, then this is a guarantee that there is "something"
whose existence we can grasp. However, when we do not
have a logos of the thing itself, "grasping that such a thing
exists" only incidentally is grasping that something exists,
since this logos does not offer any guarantee that there is
"something" whose existence we know. (It might be the
case, for exarnple, that though we believe that we grasp
that flogiston exists, through the logos "substance which
a combustible body frees when it burns", in fací we are
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not grasping the existence of anything.) Thus, when we
incidentally grasp that something exists, we do not have
genuine knowledge that it is ("we do not even know that it
exists" 93 a 26).
As a result, when we do not set out frorn a certain lo-
gos "of the thing itself", as the requirement that we should
grasp its existence is not fulfilled, we will have no knowl-
edge of the what it is. If we can only say incidentally that
we know that it is, then we can only say incidentally that
we know zohat it is. Furthermore, in such cases, the ques-
tion as to ivhat it is does not even make sense ("to seek what
something is without grasping that it exists is to seek noth-
ing" 93a 27). It is therefore clear that to be able to reach a
"demonstration of the what it is", we need to set out from
a certain logos "of the thing itself", even though we do not
yet have full knowledge of what that thing is. Frorn this
starting point, our inquiry may proceed in two ways:
- It rnay be that we do not know yet whether the
thing exists. Given that in order to know what some-
thing is it is necessary to know that it is, in these
cases we should first investígate whether the thing
exists or not. For exarnple, we investígate whether it
is eclipsed or not. As Aristotle says in chapter 2, ask-
ing whether it is is the same as looking for a middle,
but he now adds that looking for this is the same as
asking if there is a logos of being eclipsed (93a 33).
- However, we rnay already be certain that it exists,
in which case our investigation will commence di-
rectly by looking for why. Here, we do not look to
see if there is a middle or a logos, but rather what
the middle or logos is (93b 5). For exarnple, we try
to establish what the logos of being eclipsed is: is the
earth screening, does the moon roíate, or is its light
extinguished?
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At this stage of our investigations, two logoi have al-
ready played a part: a certain logos concerning what the
eclipse is (the logos which is our starting point), and a logos
concerning why being eclipsed holds of the moon (the log-
os needed for us to be able to construct the demonstration).
When we fínd this logos of being eclipsed, if we have found
the right middle, we shall have a syllogism in which the
fact that it is (that it is eclipsed) and the reason why (the
cause of its being eclipsed) are both evident at the same
time. If the right logos of being eclipsed is "screening by
the earth", we will know sdentifically that the moon is
eclipsed, at the same time as we also know that the reason
for this being eclipsed is the screening by the earth.
On the other hand, when we have not found the right
middle (for example, when we take as middle the logos of
sorne phenomenon which accornpanies the eclipse, but
which is not its cause: "not being able to produce a shadow
during full moon"), even if we have attained some genuine
knowledge that it is (we know that "there is something"
which prevenís us from producing a shadow during full
moon), the logos through which we know this gives us no
information as to why the rnoon is eclipsed, and as a result,
no information about the genviine ivhat it is of the eclipse.
Aristotle's proposal is that the logos which functions as a
middle, which tells us why being eclipsed holds of the moon
(the reason why of the combination), can also undertake a
"dernonstrative" task as far as the what it is of the eclipse is
concerned (the essence of the compound). By poínting to the
reason why being eclipsed holds of the moon, it can serve
to give us "dernonstrative" knowledge of the essence of the
eclipse. Thus the middle serves not only to demónstrate the
conclusión that "the moon is eclipsed" (by letting us know
why this combination holds), but also to "demónstrate"
that the eclipse is what it is, by enabling us to construct a
certain logos (a "dernonstrative" logos) which expresses in
the rnost perfect way possible what the eclipse is (what the
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compound entity under investigation is). How it does so is
not explained until chapter 10, where Aristotle analyses the
different ways in which definitions can behave with respect
to demonstrations. For the mornent, we know that the "de-
rnonstrative" logos of what the compound is is only reached
when we have achieved the genuine demonstration, the syl-
logism whose middle is the cause of the combination.
Once the last stage of inquiry has been reached (in-
quiry which starts from the possession of a logos of the
thing itself and gets under way as a search for the logos of
the major extreme), a third logos has become apparent, the
"dernonstrative" logos of the what it is,6 but this is not the
only "logos of the what it is" related to demonstration. Un-
derstanding what type of logos is like a "demonstration" of
the what it is means being quite clear about the distinction
between this and the other "logoi of the what it is" involved
in the demonstration.
4. Narrowing down the answer: What ¡s the
w/7o////sthat is made manifest ¡n the demonstration?
(PosteriorAnal/fíes \\ 9)
Up to now we have encountered three logoi involved
in demonstration: a logos of what the eclipse is (grasped
mitially), which serves to trigger our research; a logos of
being eclipsed (which is the logos that expresses the rea-
son why the moon is eclipsed, which we need to be able to
demónstrate that the moon is eclipsed); and another logos
concerning what the eclipse is (which is shown through
demonstration). In chapter 9, a further type of logos of the
what it is appears, which Aristotle brings up to rnake it clear
that, even though it is possible to "demónstrate" some what
it is in the way that has been indicated, not every what it is
can be shown by demonstration.
6. We shall see that the "demonstrative logos of the what il ¡s" is not the dem-
onstration itself (since a demonstration does not demónstrate the what it is of the
compound, but the that it is of the combination, through its reason ivhy).
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can have with regard to demonstratíon. The confusión of
these perspectives, together with interference from other
kinds of logos which are not definitions but which are also
under scrutiny in this chapter (the "logos of the meaning of
the ñame" and the logos whose unity is that of a mere "con-
nection"), is what has given rise to the controversy as to
how many types of definition there are, and whether some
types are the same as others.
In this section, I shall turn to the senses of "definition"
(there are two of them), and to the consequent división of
definitions into species (there are also two of these). In the
following section, I shall address the functions of definition
in the context of demonstratíon (there are three of these).
5.1. THE TWO SENSES OF "DEFINITION"
In chapter 10, Aristotle explicitly formulates two "defi-
nitions of 'definition'". In 93b 29, he defines horismos as a
logos of what it is, and at 93b 39 he defines horas as a log-
os which indicates why something is.8 Regarding each of
these two senses of "definition", Aristotle deems it neces-
sary to pay special attention to distinguishing definitions
from other types of logos which might seem similar, but
which are not definitíons.
5.1.1. The definition as "logos of the what it is". The
problem of the so-called "nominal definition".
As far as the first sense of "definition" is concerned, the
problem is that not everything that seems to be a "logos of
the what it is" is a true definition. This may come about in
two different ways: because the thing that has been named
does not exist (and therefore there is nothing to define), or
because the logos lacks unity (it is one only by connection,
8. To my knowledge, no scholar has taken the fact that he uses horismos for the
firsl sense and horas for the second to be significant.
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like the Iliad, because there is no "one thing" in the prop-
er sense which can support this unity).9 In neither case is
there a what it is that can be defined, although in both there
can be a logos that resembles a definition. Concerning the
problem of existence, the "logos of what the ñame means"
comes into play, which has traditionally been interpreted
as a certain "type" of definition, the so-called "nominal
definition". The basic issues which the passage raises, and
which are still a matter for díscussion, are: whether the
logos Aristotle is talking about here is a type of definition,
whether it belongs to things that exist or do not exist, and
why it does not appear in the final list of definitions.10 It ís
worth analysing this point in more detail.
Aristotle presents a first definition of "definition" as a
logos of the what it is. If we have a logos of what the thing
is, it is obvious that this logos also gives us an explanation
of what the ñame of the thing means. For example, a logos
of what a triangle is can be used to explain the meaning
of the ñame "triangle": "a figure with three sides". Why
does Aristotle here focus on the logos of the meaning of the
ñame? Because an explanation of the meaning of the ñame
may have an important role in scientific inquiry: when we
do not know that the thing exists, we must start out from a
certain kind of knowledge of what it is, in order to be able
to grasp the thing's existence and thus ask the question as
to why it exists. But when we do not know that the thing
exists, it is not strictly possible to ask what it is: all we can
ask for the moment, strictly speaking, is what the ñame of
9. For example, a logos of what U is to be a white man is not a definition, be-
cause white man has no essence, the unity is accidental. (Metaphysics VII.4) The
question is whether an eclipse, for example, has or has not a mere accidental uni-
ty. The eclipse is not a "thing", bul an "accident" that occurs when three "things"
coincide: two bodies in certain positions, and an observer placed also in a certain
position.
10. See, for example, R. Bolton (1976); A. Gómez-Lobo, "Definitions in Arislo-
tie's Posterior Analytics", in Studies in Aristotle, (D. J. O'Meara, ed.), Washington,
1981,25-46; D. Demoss & D. Devereux (1988); D. K. W. Modrak, Aristotle's T\\eor\j
ofLanguage and Meaning Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; M. De-
slauriers, (2007).
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the thing means. (And if the explanation of what the ñame
of the thing means provides us with a certain knowledge
of what it is, this will only be in the incidental sense of the
word "knowledge".)
My thesis is that in 93b 30-35, Aristotle is, on the one
hand, acknowledging the important role of the logos of the
meaning of the ñame and, on the other, warning us of the
confusión that this logos might give rise to with regard to
definition.11 He is not presenting it as a type of definition,
since although it is true that every logos of the ivhat it is
serves as a logos of the ñame, it is not true that every logos
of the ñame is also a logos of the what it is, that is, a genuine
definition. What he is doing is emphasising that "being a
defínition" is not determined by the structure that a cer-
tain logos has, but by the cognitive role that this logos plays;
that the cognitive role played by one and the same logos
can change in the coiirse of the scientific inquiry; and that,
depending on the stage of inquiry, a logos which is in itselfa
definition is not always to us a defínition in the strict sense,
but can sometimes just be "incidentally" (to us) a defini-
tion.
In my view it is obvious that, if a definition is a logos
of what it is, a logos such as this cannot be formulated of
a supposedly non-existent "thing". "Of that which does
not exist, no one knows what it is. You rnay know what
the account or the ñame means when I say 'goat-stag',
but it is impossible to know what a goat-stag is." (92b 5-8)
I agree with many of the interpreters of this issue that
this passage actually expresses Aristotle's opinión, even
though it is in one of the "aporetic" chapters.12 For this
11. I agree with Sorabji's reconstruction of 93b 32-35: R. Sorabji, "Definitions:
Why Necessary and in what Way?, in Aristotle on Science. The "Posterior Annlyíics"
(E. Berti, ed.), Antenore, Padova, 1981,205-244 (note 30).
12. See, for example, Demoss-Devereux (1988), p. 141; Deslauriers (2007), p. 71;
Sorabji (1981), p. 218. In contrast, Charles argües that there is no textual evidence
for the suggestion that Aristotle restricts definitions to being accounts of existing
things: D. Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
2000, pp. 57-77.
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reason, I consider that at the beginning of chapter 10, Ar-
istotle has no need to warn us of the danger of confusing
the logos of the meaning of a ñame, when that ñame does
not ñame anything, with a genuine defínition. What he
is trying to do is point out a more subtle diffículty which
may beset the logoi of things that really do exist: if we for-
múlate a logos of a thing that exists but whose existence is
not known to us, this logos will not yet be to us, in the strict
sense, a logos of the what it is.
As long as we do not know that the thing exists, this
logos cannot be to us a defínition in the proper sense: that is,
this logos cannot provide an answer to the question what it
is, given that this question does not yet have any meaning
to us. As we have seen, Aristotle is very concemed about
the priority of knowledge of existence over knowledge of
essence: one cannot try to grasp what a thing is, without
having previously grasped its existence. This affects cases
in which we express the meaning of a ñame by means of a
defínition. "And thus it is difficult to grasp things if we do
not know that they exist" means that when we still do not
know of the existence of a thing, a definitional logos which
gives the meaning of the ñame does not provide us with a
true grasp of its what it is, but only an incidental grasp.13 (It
may be the case, as sometimes happens, that the ñame fails
to ñame anything, and if we grasp its meaning we cannot
be grasping the what it is of nothing.)
What Aristotle is doing in 93b 30-35 is simply transfer-
ring to the sphere of what it is the distinction (previously
established for the sphere of existence) between the prop-
er sense of knowing and the incidental one. We can only
know what something is in the true sense if we have previ-
ous knowledge that it exists. The same logos that will later
exprime the what it is, when it is used at a preliminary stage
of inquiry, that is, when existence is ignored, cannot yet
provide a proper knowledge of the what it is: at that rno-
13. This would be the first interpretation offered by Ackrill (1981), p. 375.
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ment, this forrrmla can only be (to us) a "logos of the ivhat it
is" in an improper sense. It is therefore (to us) only a defini-
tion in an incidental way.14
The labels "nominal definition" and "real definition",
if we want to use them, could be useful to distinguish not
between two types of definition, but between two different
moments of one and the same logos, assodated with two
different cognitive valúes. For exarnple, if we do not know
that eclipses exist, the logos "deprivation of light" may
serve as a tool with which we can inquiry into the existence
of eclipses: at this rnoment, "deprivation of light" is not a
definition (to us) in the strict sense, as it is still unkown
whether anything exists whose what it is we can ask about.
At this stage of the inquiry, this logos is not (to us) a defini-
tion in the full sense, as it does not provide us with knowl-
edge abotit any what it fs.15 At this rnornent, the formula
sirnply gives us the meaning of a ñame (even though the
formula on itself is a logos of the what it is, it cannot give this
knowledge to us). For this reason, it can be called a "nomi-
nal definition". When, through this meaning, knowledge
in the proper sense that eclipses exist has been attained,
this same logos will have become, to us, a definition in the
true sense: this logos will be, to vis, the logos of a what it
is. If we know that eclipses exist, the logos "deprivation of
light" can give us knowledge in the proper sense (albeit of
a partial kind) of the what it is of eclipses. It can thus now
be called a "real definition".
14. Sorabji holds the same view, which he exprimes somewhat differently:
"These accounts quciH/y as accounts of ti esti, only so long as ins lances of the
things defined exist, and a man will be said to possess one of these accounts only
so long as he knows in some sense that instances exist." (1981, p. 218)
15. I disagree with Deslauriers and Demoss-Devereux: at the preliminary
stage, such a logos cannot "say something of what the deñ'niendum is". Similarly,
it does not "give us knowledge of the existence of that definiendum". (Deslau-
riers 2007, p. 72. See also Bolton 1976, p. 521.) This logos, by making the meaning
of the ñame clear, guíeles our search for knowledge of existence and henee of the
lüluit ¡t is, but does not provide neither of them. I find very illuminating the "three
stage view" of scientific inquiry developed by Charles (2000), pp. 23-56, although
I do not agree with every consequence he draws concerning definitions.
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Of course, there will be certain apparently definitional
logoi which can never turn into real definitions to us. These
are those which express the meaning of a ñame which
does not narne any existent thing (a logos of the meaning of
"goat-stag", or "vacuum"), and also those which express
the meaning of a ñame without giving us "something of
the thing itself" (since this logos does not capture the what
it is). In my view, it makes no sense to cali this kind of logoi
a "nominal definition",16 as they will never be able to ex-
press any what it is. They are not definitions in themselves,
so they cannot be incidental definitions to us. In such cases,
it would be more appropriate to keep the label of the sim-
ple "logos of the meaning of the narne".
Finally, there are certain logoi which will always be real
definitions, which can never be just incidentally a defini-
tion to us: the logos which contains the cause, given that its
formulation can only be achieved through demonstration,
can never be a logos of something whose existence is not
known. It will always, therefore, provide knowledge of the
what it is, it will always be a definí ton to us.
In short, a logos which expresses the meaning of a ñame
can be: a) only a formula which expresses the meaning of
the ñame, when the thing named does not exist or the logos
does not include "something of the thing itself", or b) a
phrase which is in itself able to express the what it is of the
thing, when the thing named really does exist and the logos
includes something of the thing itself. But this ability does
not suffice for the logos to be a definition in the strict sense
to us. In this case, with regard to the different stages of in-
quiry, this logos may be: bl) just incidentally a definition to
us, when we do not know whether the thing exists, or b2)
a true definition to us, when we know that the thing exists.
The distinction between bl and b2 is useful to indícate two
16. For Gómez-Lobo, for exarnple, these are two of the three types of nominal
definition: Gómez-Lobo (1981), p. 41. Charles considers the "account of what a
ñame signifies" as a distinct form of definition, independently of wheter or not
the ñame is naming something existent: Charles (2000), pp. 67-69.
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rnoments of the same logos in the course of scientific in-
quiry,17 but cannot be used to créate a classification of the
various types of definition. "Nominal definitions" are not
yet, to us, definitions of any kind.18
5.1.2. Definition as a "logos of why it'is". How it can be
distinguished from demonstration.
Regarding the second sense of "definition", a logos
which indicates ivhy something is could be confused with a
demonstration. Aristotle says that a definition in this sense
"is different in arrangement from a demonstration". Al-
though we could cali this a "demonstration of the ivhat it
is" (because it connects the what it is with the cause, which
is proper to demonstration), this is not a genuine demon-
stration.19 For example, we can construct a logos that tells
us why thunder occurs ("thundering occurs in the clouds
because the fire is extinguished in the clouds": this would
be a "continuous demonstration"), and a logos that tells us
what thunder is ("thunder is the noise of fire being extigu-
ished in the clouds": this is a definition which contains the
cause). It is as though one logos is being said in two different
ways, with small changes: but the changes are essential, as
in one case we have a demonstration of the thundering oc-
curring in a subject (the object of the demonstration is the
"combination"), while in the other, we have a definition of
17. There is still a third moment, when this partial definition is "demonstrated"
(and thus superseded) by the complete definition which includes the cause.
18. It is also misguided to try to find any structural characterisation of nominal
definitions (as Bolton, for example, does). What makes a logos to be a "nominal
definition" to vis is not any specific component of it, but rather the cognitive role
it is able to play.
19. Some interpreters seem to be misled by the expression "demonstration of
what something is". The "demonstration" Aristotle is speaking about is not the
demonstrative syllogism that proves, for example, that thundering holds of the
cloud. He is not telling that a demonstration can be regarded as a "definition"
in an improper sense (this is Harari's interpretation: O. Harari, Knowledge cmd
Demonstrntion. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dor-
drecht/Boston/London, 2004, pp. 134-136), but rather that certain kind of defini-
tion can be regarded as a "demonstration" in an improper sense.
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thunder (the object of the definition is the "compound").
The first logos is the one which we present in response to
the question to dioti ("why does it thunder?" using the
verb), while the second is the one we give to answer the
question ti estin ("what is thunder?" using the ñame).20 Ar-
istotle is proposing that even though these two questions
are different, when we answer the first, the answer to the
second will become apparent.
5.2. THE TWO TYPES OF DEFINITION
However, not everything can be demonstrated, ñor is
the cause of every demonstrable thing known to us, and
so the distinction between the two senses of "definition"
gives rise to a división of definitions into types (which is
implicit in 93b 39-94a 2, which mentions "the first" and
"the second", even though is is unclear what this refers
to): some definitions are only definitions in the first sense,
since they only express the what it is (we formúlate defini-
tions of this kind to express the what it is of things that can-
not be demonstrated, or of those whose cause we do not
yet know), while other definitions are "definitions" in both
senses, expressing the what it is and the why it is (a thing
which has a middle, when this middle is already known,
is defined more completely when its cause is included in
the logos of the what it fs).21 This is at first sight a structural
distinction: we can tell wheter a given definition belongs
to one or the other type by simply looking at the logos and
seeing if it contains explicit mention to the external cause.
20. Unlike Barnes (1993), I think that Aristotle's terminology when he speaks
about the "demonstration of the what it is" is indeed significant: the "ptosís" in
94a 12 must make reference to the different grammatical forms, which make the
definition different in aspect from a genuine demonstration.
21. Here I mean by "cause" the efficient one: the cause that, being different
from the thing itself, acts as the sufficient condition for its existence. I do not
include the formal cause, and this is the reason why I can distinguish between
definitions that involve the cause and definitions that do not. In this point I differ
from Deslauriers, who understands that any definition have to include causes:
(2007), pp. 81-111.
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Now, regarding their relationship to demonstration,
the very reason why there are different types of definition
is that each kind is linked to demonstration in a different
way. The difference between the two types is therefore
not simply structural, but rather has to do with the level
of knowledge at which each one is situated: the first orily
signifies the what it is, but does not demónstrate it, where-
as the second is like a demonstration of the ivhat ü is and
therefore gives us more perfect knowledge (93b 39-94a 2).
We could therefore define the two types of definition
as follows: "logos which means the ivhat it is (without dern-
onstrating it)", and "logos which 'demónstrales' the what
it. is, by expressing why it is". It is only the latter which
competes with demonstration (since both this type of defi-
nition and demonstration involve the cause: they would
both seem to answer the question to diotí). But Aristotle has
distinguished this logos from a true demonstration: dem-
onstration is the answer to the question to diotí, while defi-
nition is the answer to the question ti estin.22 It remains for
Aristotle to show how, despite their differences, definition
and demonstration are closely related.
6. The second problem, second part:
the roles of definition with regard to demonstration
[Posterior Analytics\\, 10)
The f amous list of definitions which Aristotle provides
at the end of chapter 10 is a catalogue of the different func-
tions that definitions can have in relation to demonstra-
tion. The fact that there are three different roles, but there
are only two types of definition that account for these, can
be explained by the central position which the distinction
22. I disagree with Deslauriers, who distinguishes two major types of defi-
nition, one which answers the question why, and the other which answers the
question as to what it is: (2007) pp. 46, 50. In my view, a definition always an-
swers the question "what is it?" (this is why it differs from a demonstration),
even if its phrasing indudes the answer to the "why?" question.
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between demonstrable and undemonstrable things occu-
pies in Aristotle's theory of science.23
a) An undemonstrable thing (for example, the rnoon)
only has a definition of the first type, that is, a logos
which means the what it is. As the moon does not
have a different cause, this definition is "an inde-
monstrable position of what it is" or "an indemon-
strable logos of what something is" (94a 11-12). The
part which these definitions play in demonstration
is that of being principies that are assumed, but are
not demonstrated ("and here you must suppose, or
make clear in some other way, both that the thing
exists and what it is. (Arithmeticians do this: they
suppose both what a unit is and that there are
units.)" 93b 23-25). In the case of the eclipse, this
definition is the logos oí what the rnoon is, which
has to be taken for granted in our investigation into
why it is eclipsed.
b) Demonstrable things (e.g. the eclipse) have defini-
tions of both types: a logos which signifies the what
it is, and a logos which "demónstrales" the what it is
by expressing why it is. Each of these has a different
role as far as demonstration is concerned.
b.l) About demonstrable things, which have a cause
that is different frorn themselves, it is clear that we
should be able to formúlate a logos concerning why
it is: this is the definition which becomes a "demon-
stration of the what it is", as it rnakes the cause of the
thing explicit. In the case of the eclipse, it is the logos
which defines the lunar eclipse as "a deprivation of
light caused by the screening by the earth". This is
23. This distinction is dependent on the more basic distinction between things
that have a cause different from themselves and things that have not. Deslauriers
(2007) rightly places this distinction at the core of Aristotle's discussion on defini-
tion, giving rise to the basic classification between "immediate definitions" and
"syllogistic definitions".
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precisely the definition which is achieved through
demonstration, without being demonstrated in the
strict sense. In fact, once we have a demonstration,
with the middle between the two extremes, a defi-
nition can be formed which contains the cause, and
which is therefore a kind of "demonstration of the
what it is" ("an eclipse is the deprivation of light on
account of the screening by the earth"), which dif-
fers in aspect from a demonstration proper (or from
the lagos that expresses the continuous demonstra-
tion: "a deprivation of light occurs in the rnoon be-
cause it experiences a screening by the earth").
b.2) However, it is also possible to formúlate a logas
of the ivhat it is of demonstrable things which is not
a lagos of whij it is: a definition which only signifies
the what it is, without "demonstrating" it (i.e. with-
out accounting for its cause). Clearly, a definition
which does not rnake the cause of a caused thing ex-
plicit will be an incomplete definition, giving only
partial knowledge of the what it is. Just as a definition
which tells us explicitly why it is can be regarded as
a certain type of "demonstration of the what it is",
this incomplete definition can also be considered
its "conclusión".24 In the case of the eclipse, what
is "demonstrated" by connecting it to its cause (in
the complete definition) is the lagos which (partly)
defines the eclipse as "deprivation of light". This is
24. This is not the conclusión of the demonstration of the what it is (there is
not a demonstration properly speaking of the whaí it is, as essence is not strictly
demonstrable) neither the conclusión of the demostration that it is (which is the
syllogism that provides scientific understanding of this existence), but the "con-
clusión" of the "demonstration (in the improper sense) of the what it is". Bayer
(1995) finds puzzling the fact that the conclusión of the demostration seems to be
a statement of existence, as how could it be identified with a definiton? (p. 257)
Bayer answer by using his distinction between two types of syllogisms (p. 259).
However, pnce Ackrill, who reconstructs how a syllogism whose conclusión is a
definition would be like (1981, pp. 360-363), I think that the right answer is that
no definition is the conclusión of any syllogism, but some are the "conclusión"
of a "syllogism".
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properly speaking the what it is that can be dem-
onstrated. This logos may have been present at the
outset of our research, when we did not know of the
existence of eclipses: in this case, the logos was not
to us properly speaking a definition of the eclipse,
but simply an explanation of the noun "eclipse".
Once we know that this exists, the logos turns into
a genuine definition to us, and provides us with a
certain kind of knowledge of what an eclipse is. But
this is non-scientific knowledge, which has not been
demonstrated, because it does not give us informa-
tion about the cause. When we do finally achieve,
through demonstration, the complete definition of
an eclipse, we will have scientific knowledge about
this mysterious deprivation of light.
Now that the three roles of definitions as regards dem-
onstration have been clarified, we can see that there is no
danger of rivalry between definition and demonstration:
- There are definitions which do not answer the ques-
tion "why?" (as they belong to things that do not
have any cause different from themselves), but
which have to be taken for granted in order to ex-
plain why these irnmediate things have a certain
property. In our example, the definition that an-
swers the question "what is the moon?" is such an
instance.
- There are definitions which somehow contain the
answer to the question "why?" (and which we can
therefore formúlate only insofar as we have a dem-
onstration that answers this question explicitly), 25
but which are themselves formulated in response
to another question, that is, to the question "what
25. Unless the cause is perceived: we do not require a demonstration or even
ask ourselves why, because we can see it for ourselves.
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is it?". In our example, the definítion which corn-
pletely answers the question "what is an eclipse" is
such a definition.
Finally, there are definitions which do not answer
the question "why?", even though they belong to
things which do have an external cause. These defi-
nitions are incomplete, but are the only kind we can
have at the outset of our investigation, which will
consist of looking for the right middle to complete
them, i.e.; to "demónstrate" them through a defini-
tion which contains the cause. In our example, the
definition which incompletely answers the question
"what is an eclipse?" is the only definition we can
make until we have found out the reason for this
absence of light.
We could summarise the three-fold role of defini-
tions in Aristotle's theory of demonstration as follows: the
definition is important in the theory of demonstration a)
as an undemonstrable principie of demonstration, b) as a
("demonstrable") starting point for research, and c) as a
("demonstrative") result of the demonstration. Definition
is thus revealed as a key component in Aristotle's theory
of demonstration: a) as an undemonstrable principie for a
demonstration, it excuses us from the need to demónstrate
everything, freeing us at the same time frorn the absurdi-
ties which derive from not having stable ground to build
our demonstration on; b) as the trigger for research, it ena-
bles us to resolve the Platonic paradox whereby we cannot
investígate into something's existence without knowing
its essence, ñor can we seek its essence without knowing
about its existence; c) as the result of inquiry, it enables us
to realise how having a scientific demonstration increases
our knowledge: it provides us with knowledge of the what
it is that is deeper, reaching down to the causes.
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7. Definiíion ¡n medieval comrnenlaries:
Averroes and Grossetesíe
In this section I would like to examine how two great
commentators on Aristotle understood his ideas about def-
initions. The contrast between Averroes and Grosseteste
will enable me to bring out some of the points that I re-
gard as the key to interpreting chapter 10. In my opinión,
Averroes' commentary on these pages is an example of a
very neat reading of Aristotle, with a clear grasping of the
underlying problems.26 Grosseteste's one, on the contrary,
is an example of a rather loaded reading, that replaces the
Aristotelian genuine problems by some worries alien to
the real concerns of Aristotle in this particular chapter.27
7.1. AVERROES
As might be expected, the most illuminating analyses
are located in the Long Commentary. The Mídale Commentary
just contains a brief explanation of the notion of definition
and the different types into which it can be divided (29 rb-
va): a straightforward reading of Aristotle, doubtless col-
oured by Themistius' paraphrase. Nevertheless, some of the
key aspects of Averroes interpreta tion are already present in
this work: a notion of definition as connected with essence
("substantiam" in the latín translation) and therefore with
existent things, and an examination of the "oratio dedarans
nomen" as an improper kind of definition, with the explicit
declaration that there are just three species of definition.
26. My reading of Averroes is limited by the fact that I have to approach his
work through translations. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venetiis
1562-1574). Reprint: Minerva G. m. b. H., Frankfurt am Main, 1962. Averrois Ex-
positionis Mediae In Librum Demonstrationis Aristotelis (Vol. J part. 2b), and Averrois
In Librum Aristotelis de Demonstratione Máxima Expositio (Vol I part. 2a). In my
citations of the Long Commentnry, I will indícate wheter the text corresponds to
Ábrame de Balmes' translation (A) or to Burana's one (B).
27. Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros. In-
troduzione e testo critico di Pietro Rossi, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze, 1981.1 will use the
line numbers of this edition for my citations.
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In the Mídale Commentary, after characterising the defi-
nition in general terms as a "phrase which rnakes mani-
fest the essence of the thing and its attributes" and after
a brief mention of the essential unity of any definitional
logos, Averroes devotes a few lines to explaining the dif-
ferent types of things we cali "definitions". In his opinon,
we apply the ñame "definition" to four different kinds of
thing, though the first one is an improper use of the word.
The logos of what the ñame means gets a sepárate place in
the list of definitions: it is not identified with any of the fol-
lowing types.
A "phrase which declares the ñame" (oratio dedarans
nomen), Averroes says, "comes from the ñame without
meaning that the thing is or is not" (it is exiens ab ipso absque
eo quod significet quod haec res su aut non sif). This existen-
tial neutrality is the reason why the phrase which declares
the ñame is not regarded as a true definition. In contrast, a
definition in the proper sense is one that "shows the sub-
stance of the existing thing" (doceat substantiam entis). Aver-
roes explicitly connects the definition in the proper sense
with existence, following the Aristotelian principie that if
we do not know that sornething exists, we cannot have au-
thentic knowledge about either what or why.
Concerning the proper senses of "definition", they
constitute three mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive cat-
egories. Everything that we properly cali a "definition"
must fall into one of these three categories, and only one.
Within definitions proper, a first kind is the one which lets
us know about what and ivhy, which could be called the
"'demonstratio varíala positione". (Averroes paraphrases Ar-
istotle in distinguishing two different questions, "propter
quid existil tonitruus" and "quid est tonitruus". He makes
explicit mention to the change of order in the respective
answers, but does not emphasise the contrast between the
forrn which uses the verb and the form which uses the
ñame.) A second type is the definition per se nota, which is
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an undemonstrable principie for a demonstration. A third
type of definition is the conclusión of the demonstration
(Averroes only gives one example, the conclusión which
states that thunder is a noise in the clouds, but he does not
explain what demonstration this definition is the conclu-
sión of).
Given that the passage on the different kinds of things
called "definitions" is so short (29rb-va), in the Mídale Com-
mentary Averroes does not clarify anything new, or disctiss
explicitly the criteria he used to divide definitions (prop-
erly speaking) into three categories. However, the scope of
the Long Commentary enables Averroes to sketch a much
more complete picture of the types of definition (470r-
474v), with explanations that succeed in illuminating the
main difficulties in the chapter's interpretation.
All the types which he distinguishes in the Long Com-
mentary are contained within a great definition of "defini-
tion" as "phrase which means the essence of the thing"
("oratio quae reí quidditatem significat" in Balmes' transla-
tion, "oratio significans super essentia reí" in Burana's). The
Aristotelian "logos tou ti estin" functions as a general frame-
work for all kinds of definition, not as the description of
any particular kind or sense of definition. This forces Aver-
roes to give a particular interpretation of the "one... anoth-
er" in 93b 38, as we will see later.
In what follows, Averroes offers the interpretation that
the rest of chapter 10 is dedicated to distinguishing the dif-
ferent "species into which the ñame 'definition' is divided"
(470r). He will eventually propose a total of five kinds of
(genuine) definition, which he obtains frorn two different
criteria: first, the criterion as to whether or not the defini-
tion becomes manifest through a demonstration gives rise
to a twofold división (definition which does not contain
the cause / definition by the cause); secondly, the criterion
as to how the definition behaves with regard to the dem-
onstration gives rise to a threefold división (conclusión of
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the demonstration of what something is / demonstration
of what sornething is / principie of the demonstration). The
five species or types listed are thus not mutually exclusive,
but rather belong to different classifications. On the oth-
er hand, the so-called "nominal definition" is not among
them.
In accordance with the definition of "definition" men-
tioned above, what will later be called the "nominal defini-
tion" cannot, in Averroes' view, be a genuine definition. He
explains that "One of the phrases in which the narne 'defi-
nition' is left aside is the phrase which declares the rnean-
ing of the ñame."28 Thus, Averroes is interpreting the pas-
sage in 93b 30-35 neither as the introduction of a sepárate
kind of definition (ñor as the preliminary presentation of
some definitions that will be later examined frorn a differ-
ent perspective), but as the explanation of why certain logoi
should not be taken as definitions in the true sense. What is
interesting here is the analysis which Averroes gives of this
existential neutrality of the logas of the narne which had
only been rnentioned in passing in the Mídale Commentary.
. According to Averroes, the phrase which states the
meaning of the ñame corresponds to the things whose ex-
istence is not known. For exarnple, for the narne "vacuum"
we can find a logas that explains its meaning: "a place where
there is no body", even though we do not know whether a
vacuum exists or not. Similarly, for the ñame "natura" one
can offer the logos "principie of bodies that move and rest
by themselves". It is plaín that he is characterising certain
logoi in terms of the stage of inquiry to wich they belong,
not in terms of their structure or constitutive parts. Neither
is he linking the "oratio dedarans significationem nominis"
either to things that exist or to those that do not exist: we
can construct a logos explaining the narne of any of them.
The crucial point is that a logos which merely explains the
28. "Una orationum super quibus dimittitur nomen definitionis est oratio de-
clarans significationem nominis." (470r, B)
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meaning of a ñame corresponds to things which we do
not know whether they exist or not: therefore, to things
which, following one of Aristotle's basic theses, we cannot
yet know, or even ask ourselves what they are. These "defi-
nitions" are those which we find at the beginning of our
investigation about the existence of things which have a
cause different frorn themselves.
Next, Averroes makes an interesting interpretation of
the "or sorne other name-like account" in 93b 31. He speaks
about some or aliones that "declare the narne of some things
that we have without having their narne" (470r), and he
thinks that they are included among the orationes declar-
antes significationem nominis, because of the things they are
speaking about: again, things whose existence is unknown.
The reason he gives for this inclusión is the key for his in-
terpretation of the first species of genuine definition. There
are some things whose existence is knoivn, but whose ex-
istence we do not knoiv through its causes (remember that,
for Aristotle, this way of knowing existence does not con-
stitute a genuine knowledge of existence). A definition of
these things, according to Averroes, will be a true defini-
tion in itself, but at this stage of the inquiry it will be unable
of providing a proper knowledge of the thing. To this ex-
tent, this definition is assimilated to a mere oratio dedarans
significationem nominis?*
For instance, in geometry we explain the ñame "tri-
angle" by saying that it is a figure with three sides. To
the extent that we know that triangles exist, this phrase is
a definition of the triangle: it tells us what triangles are.
But, to the extent that we do not know that triangles ex-
ist through their cause, this phrase cannot but state the
ñame (as, without a proper knowledge of existente, it
cannot give a proper knowledge of essence), and in this
29. "Atqui fuit hoc ita quoniam eorum de quibus non scitur existentia ipsorum
propter causas suas, non scitur utique existentia ipsorum secundum veritatem,
quemadmodum definiriones quae sunt de huiscemodi rebus: quae assimilantur
definitionibus quae sunt orationes declarantes nomina." (470r, B)
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sense, it resembles (functions as) a "phrase which states
the ñame".30
Averroes thus recognises ambivalent definitions, which
may or rnay not be taken as defínitions in the proper sense:
they are true defínitions insofar as they can tell us what
something is, but they are not definitions (to us) in the strict-
est sense insofar as they cannot tell us, in the strictest sense,
what something is. They cannot tell this to us, because if
we do not know in the strict sense that something exists,
we cannot have knowledge, in the strict sense, of what it is.
These phrases which are formulated when we do not know
the cause, which are genuine definitions in themselves but
are not definitions in the strict sense to us, are the key that
allows Averroes to give rneaning to "one... another" in 93b
38, which marks the first división of definitions into kinds.
The first kind is the type of definition which is formu-
lated at the outset of inquiry, when the reason why the
thing exists is not yet known. The structural mark of this
kind of definition is that it does not indícate the cause of
what is being defined, as is the case with the definition
pf triangle or circle which is the starting point of research
in geometry.31 Then Averroes interprets the Aristotelian
"means something but does not prove it" in this way: not
only that this definition does not constitute a demonstraron
of whaí it is, but also that about this definition there is no
clernonstration.32 What he might have in mind is that this
30. "Deinde adduxit exemplum istius speciei definitionum, et dixit: 'exemplum
huius quid significat quid est triangulus'; sensus est: exemplum huius per quod
monstrat Geómetra nomen trianguli ex eo quod est figura trium laterum, quoniam
hec est definitio trianguli ex parte qua est triangulus notae existen tiae apud nos, et
ipsa plañe declarat <nomen> ex parte qua triangulus non est notae existentiae apud
nos per causam suarn. Et ipsa ex hoc modo assimilatur orationibus declarantibus
nomina, hoc est, quorum ignoratur existentia absolute." (470v, B)
31. "Deinde dixit: 'una definitionum ea est quae dicta est nunc', hoc est, defi-
nitio per quam non adduxit causam consequentem definirum, quemadmodum
definitio trianguli et definitio circuli." (472r, B)
32. Et dum dixit: 'praecedens autem haec significat quidem significationem quan-
dam, veruntamen non commostrat commostrationem', intendit primam speciem defi-
nitionum quam diximus quod significet esse rem definitam, sed quod non commons-
tret illam, idest, quod de his definitionibus non sit demonstratio." (472r-v, A)
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definition is not the one that is made manifest through a
demonstration (it is, rather, the one already had at the out-
set of inquiry).
The other kind of definition is the phrase which shows
why the thing is. This definition is only for things that have
external causes (eclipses, thunder), and is the one which is
shown by demonstration.33 Averroes interprets the Aristo-
telian "demonstration of what it is" in the sense that this
kind of definiton is a demonstration in potentia: it turns into
a demonstration if the order of the terms is changed ac-
cordingly.34 He conceives the difference between definition
and demonstration no only in terms of a different arrange-
ment of constituents, but also in terms of some difference
in the nature of the constituents.35 This type of definition is
what Averroes regards as a perfect definition.
Although Averroes indicates that this first división
into types makes a distinction between definitions that are
shown by demonstration and definitions that are not, this
first división really stems frorn an analysis of the definition
in itself (definition which contains the cause / which does
not contain the cause). By contrast, the second división
comes from an analysis that is external to the definition: its
possible relationship to demonstrations. To Averroes, it is
obvious that this second división is threefold (473v).
33. "Dum dixit: 'iamque invenirur definitio una, et est oratio docens propter
quid est', sensus est: iamque invenitur species una definitionis, et est ea cuius
potentia est potentia demonstrationum, quae tradunt definitionum et causam
ipsius. Et istae sunt definitiones quae habent causam, quae est causa essentiae,
secundum id quod dixit in praecedentibus, quemadmodum definitio defectus et
definitio tonitruus, hoc est, definitiones de quibus dicitur quod manifesté fiunt ex
demonstratione, quodque non tradit ipsas demonstratio per se." (472r, B)
34. "Et cum dixit: 'planum autem quod haec altera tanquam demonstratio de
quid est, sed diversificatur demonstratio per positionem', sensus est: species au-
tem definitionum, quae est definitio per quam addudtur causa extrínseca, est in
potentia demonstratio absoluta de definitione, hoc est, tradens existentia defini-
tionis et causam ipsius simul, sed diversificatur in talibus definitiones et demons-
trationes in ordine et positione." (472v, B)
35. "Differunt autem tales definitiones et demonstrationes ordine et positione:
hoc, est, quia demonstrationum compositio sit compositio orationis enuntiative,
et definitionis compositio sit compositio conditionis et corroborationis clausulae,
ac etiam quod praeponitur in una postponitur in altera." (472v, A)
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One type of definition can be the conclusión of a par-
ticular demonstration. At first, he does not explain what
kind of demonstration this is, but he does do so when he
summarises at the end: this is the kind of "demonstration"
which, taken together, is a perfect definition.36
The second type of definition is the definition which
is like a demonstration, differing in arrangement (a defi-
nition-demonstration in which the definition-conclusion is
taken together with its cause).37 This is what can be called a
"demonstratio de essentia reí" (474r).
And the last type is the definition which can be a prin-
cipie of demonstrations. Averroes explains that these defi-
nitions are for things that do not have a middle. As a result,
they carvnot be shown by a syllogism, but are per se notae,
That is, these definitions irnmediately show that they are
definitions of existing things: this is why they can be used
as the premises of a demonstration. But he clarines the two
senses in which these "things that have no middle" can be
interpreted, and thereby explains the self-evident nature
of the corresponding definitions: they have no middle sim-
pliciter, and of thern we know per se that they are defini-
tions; or they have no middle in the science in which they
are placed, but they do in another, in which they could be
demonstrated (473v-474r).
In short, Averroes' interpretation in the Greal Commen-
tary takes its f ocus from a general idea of the definition as a
"logas of ivhat it is" and therefore as necessarily connected
to the existence of the things that are thereby defined. This
central idea, together with the Aristotelian thesis of the
priority of knowledge of existence over knowledge of es-
sence, enables Averroes to understand the role of the "logas
36. "Definitiones igitur apud ipsum sunt trium specierum: definido quae est
principium demonstrationis, et definitio quae est demonstratio variata positione,
et definitio quae est conclusio demonstra tionis, hoc est conclusio demonstratio-
nis quae est in summa definitio perfecta." (474v, B)
37. "Et definitio ex qua est demonstrationis conclusio quando autem connecti-
tur suae causae et secum capitur, est demonstratio positione differens, et haec est
altera species definitionis perfectae." (473v, A)
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which indicates the meaning of the narne" (logos which is
forrnulated when we do not know that the thing exists),
and also to reconstruct without difficulty the first división
of the definition into types: given that the existence of some
things may be known in an improper sense when we do
not know their causes, or in a proper sense when we know
their causes, the what it is can be forrnulated irnperfectly,
through a definition which does not include the cause, or
perfectly, through one which does so. This first división
seems to be conceived as applying to the definitions of
those things that have a cause different from themselves,
and it concerns the different stages of inquiry into their
essence. Finally, regarding the second división into types,
which echoes Aristotle's functional división, Averroes is
not misled'by the irnproper use of the term "demonstra-
tion". He is aware that only one type of definition plays
a role in demonstration properly speaking (the role of in-
demonstrable principie). The other two types of definition
only play a role in "demonstration" improper, that is, in
what can be called a "demonstration" of the what it is, just
because it shows the what it is through its external cause.
7.2. GROSSETESTE
The first difference from Averroes' commentary is that
Grosseteste, when comrnenting chapter 10, does not set out
by characterising definitions in general, but goes directly to
the types into which definitions can be divided. Whereas
Averroes interprets the "logos tou tí estin" at the beginning
of the chapter as a definition of "definition" which applies
in every type, Grosseteste seems to interpret this as the de-
scription of a first sort of definition.
Another serious difference is that when Grosseteste
addresses chapter 10, he is looking for the answer to a
question which Aristotle himself did not pose. The per-
spective which Grosseteste adopts to analyse this chapter
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is deterrnined by a prior assumption that the way to dem-
ónstrate a defínition is by using another definition.38 This
is conclusión XII of his commentary: "Ilhid quod est diffinitio
demonstratur per médium quod est diffinitio." (540)39 Grosse-
teste thus considers that Aristotle's división of definitions
arises frorn the attempt to clarify which definition has the
function of demonstrating and which is demonstrated. The
schema of "demonstrating" and "demonstrated" provides
a basic classification of definitions, into which Grosseteste
tries to fit the Aristotelian analysis,
On the other hand, when he seeks appropriate can-
didates for the roles of demonstrating and demonstrated,
this process is inevitably conditioned by the way he iden-
tifies the definition of a thing with its cause. Grosseteste
thus gives a certain ontological status to the definition.
Following Philoponus, he distinguishes between the 'for-
mal definition' (which he understands that Aristotle refers
to when he talks of the 'cause identical to the thing', and
which encompasses both formal and final causes) and the
'material definition', (which he believes Aristotle is refer-
ring to when he discusses the 'different and dernonstrable
cause', and which covers both the material cause and the
efficient cause).JO
In this way, the ontological criterion for the distinction
(identification with one type of cause or another) enables
hirn to lócate a first división of definitions into two kinds,
which can be used to answer the question as to demon-
strating and demonstrated definitions. On the one hand,
the formal definition is the demonstrating definition. A
formal definition cannot be the demonstrated definition,
38. For an account of this traditional interpretador! of "demonstration of the
essence" see Harari (2004), pp. 133-134 and Goldin (1996), pp. 102-106.
39. It is true that he recognises, like Aristotle, that the definition as such is not
strictly demonstrated in this way (543).
40. This is how he divides definitions in lines 694-700. But in line 575 he points
out that the 'definition by the final cause' may be a different type of definition
(to which Aristotle may be referring when he talks of a 'different but undemons-
trable cause').
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because it lacks a middle through which it can be demon-
strated of the thing (since the form of the thing is identi-
cal with the thing itself). On the other hand, the material
definition is indeed the demonstrated definition. The ma-
terial definition can be demonstrated by virtue of another
definition (the formal kind), because it has a middle, i.e., a
cause other than itself (namely, the formal definition). This
is conclusión XV: "diffinitio formalis est demonstrans diffini-
tionem materialem de diffinito et non demonstratur formalis de
diffinitosuo" (675-676).
Once he has located the demonstrating and demon-
strated definitions, Grosseteste is able to sitúate two of the
types of definition which appear on the final list in chapter
10 (the functional división of definitions): some definitions
serve as the principies of a demonstration, while others are
the conclusión of some demonstration. Since formal defi-
nitions are undemonstrable, these are the ones that func-
tion as principies of the demonstration41 (either because
the existence and essence of defined things are manifest in
themselves, or because they have been assumed without
demonstration and shown by other means). Since material
definitions are the demonstrated kind, they are the ones
that function as conclusions of the demonstration (717-
728). Grosseteste does not seem to notice that these two
senses of "demonstration" are different.
Moreover, this simple hylomorphic división leaves
two loóse ends: the third type of definition which appears
on the list at the end of chapter 10 (the one which is like
a demonstration but "differing in arrangement") and the
"logos of the meaning of the ñame" at the beginning of the
chapter, which would seem to be a further kind of defini-
tion.
The former is easy to fit in without abandoning the hy-
lomorphic framework. To account for this third type of defi-
41. But in another sense, a formal definition functions as the middle of a de-
monstration: because it is the cause by which the material definition is demons-
trated. (727)
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nition, Grosseteste proposes a composite definition (made
up of the material and the formal definition).42 He explains
that Aristotle considers this composite definition to be the
same as a demonstration, because the cause and the defini-
tion are the same, but they differ in mode.43 The difference
between definition and demostratíon seem to be conceived
only in terrns of the arrangement of words: if the compos-
ite definition is turned round, it is converted into a complete
demonstration (one which demonstrates the material defini-
tion of the defined thing, with the formal definition as a mid-
dle, and the material definition as a conclusión, placed at the
end).44 Grosseteste does not understand that the definition is
a "demonstration", in an improper sense, of the what it is, but
he interprete that this composite definition may become a dem-
onstration, in the proper sense, of one definition by means of
another.
On the other hand, to account for the "lagos of the
rneaning of the ñame", Grosseteste adds a fourth type of
definition, which is different in nature from the other three,
since it "does not clairn to say what it is, but only what the
ñame means".45 The types of definition are thus organised
according to a first rnajor división, that between diffinitio
nominis and diffinitio reí, The latter contains the three-fold
división arising frorn the hylomorphic criterion.46
42. "Et ex hac sicut corollarium manifestum est quod diffinitio composita ex
diffinilione materiali et formali est demonstratio in situ altérala". (677-679)
43. "Et dico quod diffinitio composita est idem cum demonstratione, quia cau-
sa et diffinitio idem sunt, sed differunt in modo, quia differt dicere propter quid
tonal et quid est lonilruus." (755-758)
44. "Quare hec diffinitio coniuncla: 'tonitruus esl extíncüo ignis in nube propler
continuurn sonum in nube, si converlalur silus eius, erit completa demonstratio de-
monstrans diffinitionern materialem de diffinito. In diffinifione namque composila
ordinalur diffinitío materialis ante formalem predicto modo, sed, cum convertítur talis
diffinitío in demonstratíonem, diffinitio formalis fit médium et ordinatur ante, et diffi-
nitío materialis fit ultimum et conclusio. Et sic differunt in situ et ordine terminorum,
unde idem uno modo esl diffinitio et alio modo continua demonstratio." (763-771)
45. "Et preter has diffiniliones esl diffinitio quarta que non inlendit dicere quid
est res, sed solum quid significa! nomen, ul supra dictum est." (702-704)
46. "lam igitur manifestum esl quod diffinitio primo bifarie dividilur, quia aul
esl diffinilio nominis aul rei, [...]. Diffinitio vero reí preler duas species prediclas,
scilicel diffinitionern formalem et malerialem, babel lerliam speciem que compo-
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It is in the context of the nominal definition that Gros-
seteste provides a general account of what definitions are:
"every definition is something on which the reason dis-
courses in order to know the what it is", The diffinitio nomin-
is dicens is regarded as a special type of definition, because
it corresponds to a special type of "what it is", One of these
"what it is" that can be known is simply esse in inlellectu: the
unreal sense of "what it is" is simply what the narne signi-
fies. To know it, the reason discourses on a special type of
definition, the diffinitio nominis, which explains this kind
of intellectual being.47 But to cali this a "definition" is still
an improper use of the word, since the what it is defined in
this way is not the being of the thing, but the rneaning of
the ñame. For this reason, he also says that the "definition"
which explains the rneaning of the ñame is not a true defi-
nition, ñor is it scientific (in particular, it cannot function as
a middle of a demonstration).48 But he does acknowledge
that it has a role in triggering inquiry into the thing's exist-
ence.
Grosseteste is identifying the initial "logas tou ti estin"
with the diffinitio nominis, thereby establishing a first type
of definition which he contrasts to the "definition which
demonstrates why it is": this would be the sense of "one...
another" in 93b 38, which makes a strong contrast between
two types of definition. One is the one we have at the outset
of our research, which only tells us what the ñame means,
sila esl ex duabus prediclis, et hec est secundum rem demonstrarlo unius de uno,
sicut iam explanabitur." (743-749)
47. "Quoniam quidem diffinitio omnis est id super quod decurrit ralio in cog-
nitionem quid est, esse aulem dupliciter esl in se el in inlellectu, manifestum esl
quoniam aliqua eril diffinitio super quam decurril ratio in cognilionem huius,
scilicel quid significa! nomen iam inpositum, aul erit illud super quod decur-
rit ratio in cognitionem quid significal nomen imponendum. Proponimus enim
diffinilionem explicantem esse intellecruale vel ut faciamus inlelligere quid sig-
nifical nomen ignole significationis vel ut per ipsam instituamus nomen ad sig-
nificandum." (729-737)
48. "Ule vero opposiliones, que oslendebant quod diffinilio explicans inlen-
lionem nominis in quantum huiusmodo esl non potest esse médium quo de-
monstrarur si est simpliciter et quod talis diffinitio non est diffinitio vera ñeque
scientifica, sunl oppositiones veré." (616-619)
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and the other is the one which we reach at the end, which
is able to demónstrate why the thing is.49 The difference
between nominal and real definition is not related to any
question about existence or about our knowledge of exist-
ence. It is related to the two senses of "quid est x?": one of
the senses is just "quid significat 'x'?", a question that can be
asked independently of wheter 'x' ñames or does not ñame
an existent thing, and independently of whether we know
about this existence.
Regarding the three-fold división of real definitions
(which is at once hylomorphic and functional), one of the
problems with Grosseteste's interpretation of Aristotle is
that the hylomorphic distinction obliges him to reformu-
late íhe examples in his own personal way, as Aristotle's
examples of each kind of definition do not fit into Grosse-
teste's división (760-773, 802-836). For example, the extin-
guishing of fire (which was, for Aristotle, the middle in the
demonstrative syllogism) appears in Grosseteste's materi-
al definition of thunder ("fire extinguished in the clouds"),
that is, the one that functions as conclusión of the demon-
stration. On the other hand, the noise in the clouds (which
was, for Aristotle, the "conclusión" of the "demonstration"
of the ivhat it is) appears in Grosseteste's formal definition
of thunder ("continuous noise in the clouds"), that is, the
one that functions as " demonstrating" definition and henee
as indernonstrable principie of the demonstration. Finally,
the composite definition which is like a demonstration of
what thunder is (which Aristotle formulated as "a noise of
fire being extinguished in the clouds"), is formulated by
Grosseteste as "the extinguishing of fire in the clouds by
a continuous noise in the clouds (propter continuum sonum
49. "Ergo de duabus diffinitionibus nunc ultimo dictis una est diffinitio nomi-
nis et alia est diffinitio demonstrans propter quid est; quare prius dicta illarum
ostendit quid significat nornen, et in quantum huiusmodi non demonstrat; que
vero posterius dicta est, scilicet, que composita est ex diffinitione formali et ma-
teriali, est idem quod demonstratio non differens a demonstratione nisi in situ et
ordine terminorum." (751-755)
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in nube)". If we turn this composite definition round, it be-
comes a complete demonstration which demonstra tes the
material definition of what is defined: "it thunders because
a continuous noise in the clouds is the (final) cause of the
extinguishing of the fire" (which, again, differs from the
Aristotelian continuous demonstration "thunder holds of
the cloud because the fire is extinguished in the clouds").
To sum up, I find two main shorthcornings of Grosse-
teste's interpretation: his view about "nominal definition"
and his understanding of the "demonstration of the what
is is". Where Averroes had attained some very illuminat-
ing explanations of what Aristotle intended in chapter 10,
Grosseteste uses an ontological framework that tends to
obscure the meaning of Aristotle's distinctions, rather than
shed light on them. On the one hand, Grosseteste not only
interprets the "logas of the meaning of the ñame" as a spe-
cial type of definition, but he also forces the interpretation
of the "logos tou ti estin " (with an intellectual sense of "esse",
which is equal to "significare"), and accordingly forsakes
the leading role which Aristotle artributes to existence and
to our knowledge of it. On the other hand, Grosseteste is
mislead by the improper use of the word "demonstration":
he fails to adequately distinguish between those definitions
which play a role in demonstration properly speaking (the
ones that are undemonstrable principies of demonstration,
as they define simple objects) and those definitions which
just play a role in the "demonstration" of the what it is (the
ones that correspond to complex "objects", such as eclipses
and thunders).
8. Conclusión
Although this article cannot contain a detailed analysis
of every interesting question that is rised by the Aristote-
lian texts, I hope to have shown at least both the richness
of Aristotle's thought and the efforts of the commentators
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for giving a coherent account of it. It might be that rnost
of the difficulties that we face when trying to understand
Aristotle had a root in the hidden tensión between Posterior
Analytics and Metaphysics, that is, between the strict sense
of "definition" (which is a logos of essence and thus corre-
sponds to substances), and one of the derivative senses of
"definition" (as applied to the combination of a substance
with its kath' auto symbebekos). But this is a very differ-
ent story, which does not fit into the limits of the present
work.50
50. This paper is part of a broader research on Aristotle's semantics and on-
tology, developed with the support of the Spanish Government (as part of the
Research Project "Vagueness: Predication and Truth" HUM2005-05910/FISO). I
wish to thank all the members of the research team for the cooperative reading
of Aristotle. I also thank Alejandro Vigo for his very helpful comments on the
draft of this paper. Finally, I am specially grateful to Ángel d'Ors for continuous
feedback and always valuable suggestions.
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On the Intuition of Real Essences
Aristotelian definitions claim to get at the real es-
sences of objects. Aristotle hirnself distinguishes such real
definitions from nominal definitions. [An. Po. 11.10] These
real definitions give formulae of the essences: what it is for
things, primarily substances, to be. [Metaph. 1029b25-6]
For many today such pronouncements of réaf defi-
nitions arnount to jokes. I need not resort to post-mod-
erni like Foucault to make this point.1 Famously Quine
charges that what attributes something has are deter-
mined by convention and pragrnatics. Take a human be-
ing like Xanthippe. If we are interested in her riding a
(normal) bicycle, then being two-legged is essential to
her, while being rational is not; if we are interested in
her qua rnathematician, then being rational is essential
to her, while being two-legged is not.2 To be sure, in our
theories, both in biology and in politics, we find being
rational more important to Xanthippe than being two-
legged usually. If she lost her legs, we would still cali
her Xanthippe; if she lost her reason, we would tend no
longer to cali her 'Xanthippe' and 'a human being' —es-
pecially if she lost her reason by becoming a corpse. Rel-
1. Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses. (Paris, 1966).
2. Word and Object (Cambridge, 1960), p. 199.
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